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 1 
INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION: LEGISLATING TRIBAL 
CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS 
 




The United States began signing treaties with Indian Nations in 1778,1 and in 
1831 the U.S. Supreme Court described the Indian nations existing within the 
territorial boundaries of the United States as Domestic Dependent Nations.2 Until 
1978, Indian nations were thought to possess all the inherent sovereign powers 
over their territories that had not been taken away by Congress or given up in 
treaties.3 However, preoccupied by the assertion of tribal jurisdiction over 
individuals who were not tribal members, the Supreme Court in 1978 devised what 
became known as the implicit divesture doctrine.4 Under that doctrine, Indian 
tribes are said to have lost all inherent sovereign powers inconsistent with their 
status as domestic Dependent Nations.5 As a result of this doctrine, since 1978, the 
tribes initially lost all inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members,6 and 
as will be explained below, a good deal of civil or regulatory jurisdiction as well.7 
The Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been almost universally condemned 
by leading scholars as being confusing to the point of incoherence.8  These 
                                                      
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
J.D. Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.  Prior to joining Academia, the 
author served as Deputy Counsel for Indian Affairs for the Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives having jurisdiction over most legislation related to Indian Affairs.  The 
proposal presented here draws from that experience.  This research was made possible, in 
part, through a grant from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.       
1 Treaty with the Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13 (1778). In doing so, the United States 
followed a tradition started by the Europeans Nations.  
2 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
3 See Felix Cohen’s HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2012 Ed.) at 222-
223.  
4 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)(Holding Indian tribes 
implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.) 
5 Id., at 208.  
6 Parts of the Supreme Court decisions in the criminal area were overturned 
legislatively. See notes….infra. 
7  This paper will use the term “non-members” to describe those individuals who are 
not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction in a given case.  
8 See for instance, Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, : 
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 
(1999), David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Federal Indian Law, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1573 (1996), Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121 (2006), Michalyn 
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 U.C.L.A. 
L. Rev. 666 (2016).  
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scholars have argued that when it comes to gauging tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-members, the Implicit Divestiture doctrine is a moribund doctrine of federal 
common law unmoored from any congressional policies or constitutional values. It 
is a doctrine that has been manipulated by the Court to achieve politically desired 
results. Others have been more circumspect in criticizing or condemning the 
doctrine.9  Whether justifiable or not, the various formulations of the doctrine has 
resulted in confusion and dis-uniformity in the lower courts when it comes to 
determine the extent of tribal jurisdiction over non-members.10   
While some scholars have offered constructive suggestions and insightful 
alternatives to the doctrine,11 in the wake of the recent 4-4 vote in Dollar General 
v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw,12 one has to wonder if the Court is at all willing to 
reconsider its approach. While I have in the past joined the ranks of those 
advocating for the Court to adopt a different approach,13 in this Article I suggest 
that the time is ripe to consider legislative solutions to remedy the current state of 
uncertainty when it comes to the extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members.14 After all, Congress is the entity named in the Constitution to regulate 
commerce with Indian tribes.15 As early as 1855, the Court confirmed that 
although Indian Nations had retained much of their inherent sovereignty over both 
their people and territories, the U.S. Congress possessed “plenary authority” to 
                                                      
9 See for instance, Michael Doran, Redefining Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental 
Rights (forthcoming, Indiana Law Review), Electronic Copy available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398215.  (Arguing that the Court devised the doctrine as a way 
to recognize the continued existence of tribal sovereignty while at the same time protecting 
the fundamental rights of people who are not members of the tribe.)  See discussion infra at 
notes…    
10 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian 
Law, 32 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 391, 409-414 (1007-08). 
11 See Matthew Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 Ariz St. L. J. 
779 (2014)(Hereinafter Fletcher, Unifying Theory), Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, 
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 1499 (2013) (hereinafter, Florey 
Beyond Uniqueness).  
12 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). The tie meant that the decision below in favor of tribal 
court jurisdiction stood.  
13 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the 
Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 77 (2014-15). 
14 Others have also argued for legislative solutions. See for instance, Ann E. Tweedy, 
Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. 
Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 
42 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 651 (2009)(hereinafter Tweedy, Connecting the Dots). See also 
R. Stephen McNeill, Note, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposal to Incorporate Tribal 
Courts into the Federal Court System Without Compromising Their Unique Status as 
“Domestic Dependent Nations,” 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 283 (2008)(advocating for a 
restoration of tribal court civil jurisdiction but recommending the creation of a new Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals to review tribal court decisions for violation of constitutional 
rights.)  
15 U.S. Constitution, art. I, Section 8, cl. 3.  
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govern those domestic nations.16 While I am aware that the tribes would face an 
uphill battle in attempting to enact such legislation, it is not an impossible task. 
Scholars have already noted that Tribes are surprisingly adept at successfully 
pushing legislation through Congress.17 As I and others have suggested, however, 
it might be easier for such legislation to be enacted on a tribe by tribe basis.18  
This Article, therefore, discusses the various options available to fashion a 
legislative correction to the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members. PART I summarizes the Court’s jurisprudence in 
the area of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members and outlines the major 
problems the Court has noted in recognizing such tribal jurisdiction. PART II 
outlines three potential legislative proposals that would confirm tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members while also attempting to meet the concerns outlined 
by the Court. Because the three proposals all involve granting all or at least some 
of the protections of the Bill of Rights to non-members subject to tribal 
jurisdiction, this Part also discusses the concerns with incorporating Indian tribes 
within our constitutional system. Taking such concerns seriously, PART III comes 
up with a new legislative proposal which would minimize federal court 
interference with the legal and cultural distinctiveness of the tribal judiciaries.  
Simply put, the proposal is to reconfirm the civil jurisdiction of any tribal 
court over non-member defendants in all causes of action arising on the reservation 
as long as the tribal court has met the requirements for establishing personal 
jurisdiction over the parties as that term is defined and understood under applicable 
U.S. Supreme Court precedents.  In addition, tribal courts determinations 
concerning the existence of personal jurisdiction would be appealable to federal 
courts. Furthermore, in order to facilitate passage of this legislative proposal, I am 
recommending allowing non-members the option of removing to federal court 
cases filed against them in tribal courts if certain conditions are met.  
 
PART I:  TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS 
 
1.  The Court’s Jurisprudence 
 
                                                      
16 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 571-74 (1846). See Maggie Blackhawk, 
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1789, at 1829-30 
(2019). On congressional authority over Indian tribes, see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the 
Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).  
17 See for instance, Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 77 (2015). See also Carlson, Legislating Against the Odds, 56 Harv. J. on Legis 23 
(2019). 
18 See Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra at note 14, at pp 702-709 
(2009)(suggesting a piecemeal or subject specific approach.) See also Alexander Tallchief 
Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for 
Equilibrium or Supremacy? 8 Colum. J. of Race and Law 277, at 318-320 (2018). 
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Because scholars and commentators have already spent considerable amount 
to ink analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence in this area,19 I will only go over the 
highlights in this analysis. My purpose here is to show that, as in other areas of 
federal Indian law, while the implicit divestiture doctrine may have started as a 
sensible limiting principle on tribal sovereignty, it ended up being used as a 
political tool to privilege the rights and interests of non-Indians and non-tribal 
members at the expense of tribal sovereign interests in governing their territories.20  
The implicit divestiture doctrine has its roots with the 1978 decision in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 21 where the Supreme Court ruled that Indian 
tribes had been implicitly divested of the inherent sovereign power to prosecute 
non-Indians. According to the Court, such inherent power had been divested 
because its exercise by the tribes was “inconsistent” with the tribes’ status as 
Domestic Dependent Nations existing within the borders of the United States.22 
The Court further held that it was inconsistent with tribal status for tribes to 
exercise any inherent power in conflict with the overriding sovereign interests of 
the United States.23 In Oliphant such conflict existed because these non-Indians 
could be prosecuted by the tribes without being given all the protections of the 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.24 This was a consequence of Talton v. Mayes,25 
where the Court held that Indian tribes did not derive their governmental powers 
from the Constitution and therefore were not bound by it. 
Although Oliphant only dealt with the tribal power to criminally prosecute 
non-Indians, the case was extended a few years later to tribal regulatory power 
over non-members. The issue in Montana v. United States 26 was whether the Crow 
Indian Tribe could regulate non-members fishing on state owned lands within the 
exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian reservation. After noting that the restriction 
on tribal criminal jurisdiction recognized in Oliphant also supported the 
proposition that “the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the 
dependent status of tribes,”27 the Montana court came up with the “general 
proposition that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
                                                      
19 See sources listed at note 8. See also, Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra at note 
14. for a comprehensive treatment of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members see Sarah 
Krakoff, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide of Judges, 81 U. 
Colo. L., Rev. 1187 (2010). 
20 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in 
Federal Indian Law, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 67 (2019).  
21 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
22 Id., at 208. 
23 Id., at 209. 
24 Id., at 210.  
25 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  
26 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
27 450 U.S. at 564.  
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activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”28 The Court quickly added, however, that in 
certain circumstances  
 
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-
Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or 
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee 
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.29 
 
These two exceptions to Montana’s general proposition or rule would come to 
be known as the consensual relations exception and the self-government exception. 
Although not explicitly spelled out by the Court, it can be inferred that the two 
exceptions reflect what the Montana Court believed were powers “necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”30 In the wake of 
Montana, some tribal advocates expressed the feeling that they could work with 
these principles, no doubt envisioning a broad scope for the two exceptions. 
Initially, the Court seemed to go along. Thus, in National Farmers Union v. Crow 
Tribe,31 the Court insisted that before filing their challenge to tribal jurisdiction in 
federal court, non-member plaintiffs had to exhaust their tribal court remedies 
because “the existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will require a 
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, and the extent to which that sovereignty 
had been altered, divested, or diminished.”32 Two years later, in another tribal 
exhaustion of remedies case, the Court stated “Because the Tribe retains all 
inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal 
Government, the proper inference from silence… is that the sovereign power… 
remains intact.”33 As further explained below, the honeymoon between the tribes 
and the implicit divestiture doctrine did not last long.  
Since Montana, when it comes to regulatory jurisdiction, except for an early 
victory in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache upholding tribal taxation of a non-Indian 
energy corporation leasing lands from the tribe,34 and a mixed result in Brendale v. 
                                                      
28 Id., at 565.  
29 Id. 
30 See note 27 supra.  
31 471 U.S. 845 (1985).  
32 Id., at 855-56.  
33 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).  
34 455 U.S. 130 (1982). At the time, Montana was held to only apply to non-member 
fee land within the reservation. Whether the same result would obtain after Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), is debatable. See discussion infra at notes …  
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Confederated Tribes (zoning),35 the tribal interests lost the only other case, 
Atkinson Trading v. Shirley,36 involving taxation of a non-Indian hotel owner 
located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo reservation.37 When it comes to 
the adjudicative jurisdiction of the tribal courts, the tribal interests lost all three 
cases,38 before deadlocking 4-4 without an opinion in Dollar General.39  
For a while, some tribal advocates had hoped that the Montana analysis would 
only be applicable to tribal regulatory authority and not to the adjudicatory 
jurisdiction of tribal courts. The Court itself gave some reasons for tribal optimism. 
For instance, in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante,40 it stated “Tribal authority over the 
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal 
sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal 
courts.”41 However, the Court dispelled that notion in 1997 with Strate v. A-1 
Contractors,42 when it held that Montana was applicable to limit both tribal 
regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction and that “A tribe adjudicative Jurisdiction 
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”43  
The issue in Strate was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a 
lawsuit filed by one nonmember against another nonmember over a run of the mill 
traffic accident that took place on a state highway running through the reservation. 
The Court held that opening the tribal court to such suits was “not necessary to 
tribal self-government and … is not crucial to the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health and welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes}”44 The 
importance of Strate is not only that it substantially narrowed Montana’s second 
exception but also that it laid down the rule that a tribal court has jurisdiction over 
                                                      
35 492 U.S. 408 (1990). The case is a good example about how politically manipulated 
the implicit divestiture doctrine can be. In Brendale, four justices held that the Tribes can 
never zone the fee lands of non-members, three Justices held that tribes could always do so. 
The other two Justices, Stevens and O’Connor, decided to split the baby in two and 
allowed the tribe to zone non-member fee land in one part of the reservation (closed part) 
but not the other (open part). Although these two Justices made a valiant attempt to justify 
their result, they were severely criticized by the other seven Justices.  
36 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
37 Although some may categorize South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) as 
involving the implicit divestiture doctrine, this is not the case as the Court ended up 
remanding on that issue. It was plain, however, that the author of the Opinion, Justice 
Thomas, had no doubt the tribe would lose since he stated “After Montana… tribal 
sovereignty over nonmembers cannot survive without express congressional delegation … 
and is therefore not inherent.” Id., at 695, n.15 (1903).  
38 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 
(2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  
39 Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).  
40 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
41 Id., at 18.  
42 520 U.S. 438 (1997).  
43 Id., at 453.  
44 Id., at 459.  
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non-members only in cases where the tribal legislative body could also have 
regulated the activities of such non-members.45  
In both Strate and a 2001 case, Atkinson Trading v. Shirley,46 involving tribal 
taxing authority over non-members, the Court went out of its way to specify that 
the lands where the non-member activities took place was owned in fee by non-
members. However, later in 2001, the Court in Nevada v. Hicks unanimously held 
that the Montana principle extended to both non-Indian and Indian owned land.47 
The issue in Hicks was whether a tribal member could sue two state game wardens 
in tribal court. Hicks had alleged that the wardens had damaged his property and 
violated his civil rights when they searched his home which was located on Indian 
owned land within the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes reservation in western 
Nevada. The wardens had conducted the search as part of an investigation into 
alleged violations by Hicks of state hunting regulations committed outside the 
reservation.  
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and although he concluded that 
“tribal authority to regulate state officers, in executing process related to the 
violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or 
internal relations,”48 his analysis deviated substantially from previous implicit 
divestiture cases. Thus, after stating that “state sovereignty does not end at a 
reservation’s border,”49 he asserted that evaluating the tribal right of self-
government requires “an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and 
the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.”50 In 
other words, he performed some sort of “balancing of the interests test.”51 
Although all Justices agreed to extend Montana to activities conducted on Indian-
owned land, the Court was badly split on what weight the status of the land should 
carry in performing any balancing of the interest test to determine whether the 
Tribe had jurisdiction.  
Justice Scalia writing for the Court took the position that the status of the land 
can be, at times, an important factor.52 It should be noted, however, that only 
Justices Rehnquist and Ginsburg agreed with him on that specific point. Justices 
Souter, Kennedy and Thomas took the position that the status of the land was 
never a “primary jurisdictional fact.”53 Finally, Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and 
Stevens thought that the status of the land was always an important consideration.54 
                                                      
45 Id., at 453. 
46 532 U.S. 645 (2001)(Holding that the tribe could not impose a room occupancy tax 
on a hotel located inside the Navajo reservation but on non-Indian fee land.).  
47 533 U.S. 353 (2001) 
48 Id., at 364.  
49 Id., at 361. 
50 Id., at 362 
51 For a more retailed analysis, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out of 
Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347 (2001).  
52 Id., at 370-374.  
53 Id., at 375-376 (Souter, concurring).  
54 Id., at 395-396 (O’Connor, concurring in part).  
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Hicks created much confusion and disagreements concerning how expansive 
or narrow the holding was.55 Some courts have interpreted Hicks narrowly,56 others 
have disagreed.57 More recently, the 9th Circuit held that Hicks was not applicable 
when there were no state law enforcement interests at stake.58 The 9th Circuit also 
has taken the position that Hicks, or Montana for that matter, are not applicable to 
cases occurring on Indian owned land where the Tribe has retained a treaty right to 
exclude.59  
The last Supreme Court’s opinion involving the implicit divestiture doctrine, 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch,60 shows that the doctrine is so 
malleable that it can be easily manipulated to reach just about any kind of result. 
At issue was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit brought by 
tribal members against a non-Indian bank alleging that the bank had discriminated 
against them by offering to sell land within the reservation to non-members on 
more favorable terms that it was willing to offer them. Although the land at issue 
was now owned by the non-Indian bank, the case clearly involved contractual or 
consensual relations as the land had been previously owned by the tribal plaintiffs 
who had forfeited the land to the bank but were attempting to repurchase it from 
that same bank.61 The Court in a 5-4 opinion per Justice Roberts held that the tribal 
court did not have jurisdiction because ”the Tribe lacks civil authority to regulate 
the Bank’s sale of its fee land.”62 Thus, Justice Roberts took the position that 
Montana only allowed tribes to regulate the “conduct” of non-members in certain 
circumstances,63 but that the sale of land was not “conduct” for the purpose of 
allowing tribal jurisdiction under Montana.64  
According to the tribal plaintiffs, however, the conduct at issue was not so 
much the “sale” of non-Indian land as it was the discrimination involved in the 
sale of land.65 Pushed to its ultimate limit, this decision would foreclose Indian 
                                                      
55 For a recent summary of the various positions in a case where a cert petition is 
currently pending at the Supreme Court see Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria, 922 F.3d 
892, 899-902 (9th Cir. 2019). 
56 See McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002), Smith v. Salish and 
Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).  
57 MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).  
58 Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir 2017).  
59 See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Are v. La Rance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 
2011). For an insightful and comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Judith V. Royster, 
Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over Nonmembers on Trust 
Lands, 57 Ariz. L. rev. 889 (2015).  
60 554 U.S. 316 (2008).  
61 The tribal plaintiffs had forfeited the land because they were unable to make the 
monthly mortgage payments.  
62 554 U.S. at 330.  
63 Id., at 332 
64 Id., at 334, (stating that “the distinction between sale of the land and conduct on it 
is well established… and entirely logical given the …liberty interest of nonmembers.”)  
65  This why Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part,  argued that 
the Court should have just limited the tribal court remedy (forcing the sale of land to the 
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tribes from ever sanctioning non-members for discriminating against tribal 
members when selling anything on the reservation.66 
 
2.  United States v. Lara and the Constitutionality of Legislation Reaffirming 
Tribal Inherent Civil Jurisdiction over Non-members 
 
Before proceeding to describe potential legislative solutions to the Court’s 
implicit divestiture doctrine, a word on the constitutionality of such legislation is in 
order. In United States v. Lara,67 the Court held that Congress could reaffirm the 
inherent power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians even though the 
Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina,68 had held that power to have been implicitly 
divested.69 At issue in Lara was the constitutionality of the so called Duro Fix 
legislation.70 That legislation had amended the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to 
provide that the tribes’ power of self-government included “the inherent power of 
an Indian tribe, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians.”71 The question in Lara was whether the United States could 
prosecute Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa, after the Spirit Lake Indian tribe had already prosecuted him for the 
same crime. Lara argued that because Congress could not have reaffirmed the 
inherent power of the tribe to prosecute him, the first (tribal) prosecution must 
have been done pursuant to a “delegation” of federal authority to the tribe. The 
second (federal) prosecution for the same crime, therefore, was barred by the 
Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.72  
The Court held that Congress could indeed reaffirm the inherent power of 
Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians such as Lara, even after Duro v. 
Reina. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Court found that decisions such as 
Oliphant and Duro were not constitutional decisions. Instead they were decisions 
based on Federal common law. The Duro-Fix legislation just “relaxes the 
                                                                                                                                          
tribal Plaintiffs) while still upholding the tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination 
claim. Id at 342-352.  
66 At least if such sales occurred on non-Indian fee land although some would argue 
that Hicks may have blurred any distinction between Indian and non-Indian owned land 
within a reservation.  
67 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
68 495 U.S. 676 (1990).  
69 Duro had basically extended the rational of Oliphant which had dealt with tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, meaning 
members of other tribes than the prosecuting tribe. 
70 For a more comprehensive treatment, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina 
and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 767 (1993).  
71 25 U.S. C. 1301(2).  
72 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in part “nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 
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restrictions… that the political branches had imposed on the tribes’ exercise of 
inherent prosecutorial power.”73 The Court further found that Oliphant and Duro 
 
reflect the Court's view of the tribes' retained sovereign status as of the 
time the Court made them. They did not set forth constitutional limits 
that prohibit Congress from changing the relevant legal circumstances, 
i.e., from taking actions that modify or adjust the tribes' status. To the 
contrary, Oliphant and Duro make clear that the Constitution does not 
dictate the metes and bounds of tribal autonomy, nor do they suggest that 
the Court should second-guess the political branches' own 
determinations.74 
 
As I have argued elsewhere, however, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Lara seems 
to be at odd not only with the actual rational of Duro,75 but also with the Montana 
line of cases.76 Thus, the Lara Court failed to mention that Montana had given a 
somewhat different explanation than Oliphant for divesting tribes of jurisdiction.77 
Furthermore, unlike Oliphant and arguably Duro, the Montana Court never relied 
on or cited any congressional statutes reflecting a congressional support, explicitly 
or implicitly, for the proposition that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members had 
been implicitly divested.78 Could this mean that the Lara analysis concerning the 
existence of congressional power to reaffirm the inherent powers of Indian tribes to 
criminally prosecute non-members would not be applicable to legislation 
reaffirming the existence of tribal inherent civil jurisdiction over non-members? 
Not really. For one, Justice Stewart in Montana relied completely on Oliphant 
when he wrote “Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in 
criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition 
that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe does not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe.”79 
It has to be noted that although Billy Jo Lara had argued that his prosecution 
was conducted in violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court held that because of the procedural posture of the case “We need not, and we 
shall not, consider the merits of Lara’s due process claim.”80 While the Court has 
never definitely addressed the validity of such due process claims and scholars 
have disagreed as to their merits,81 the more credible attacks on such legislation is 
                                                      
73 541 U.S. at 200.  
74 Id., at 205.  
75 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic 
of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47, 53-56. 
76 Id., at 56-57.  
77 See discussion supra at….. 
78 Skibine, Dialectic of Incorporation, at 57. 
79 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).  
80 Id., at 209.  
81 Compare Gould, “Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson 
and Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669 (2003)(against the Duro Fix) with Samuel E. Ennis, 
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the potential lack of available due process during criminal prosecutions.82 Even if 
they have some validity, which is by no means certain,83 such due process 
arguments  would have much less force when considering legislation confirming 
tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction over non-members. In such civil cases, 
controversial tribal provisions such as the lack of any obligations to provide 
counsels to indigent defendants in tribal criminal cases would not be implicated.  
Finally, even though he is no longer on the Court, Justice Kennedy’s concerns 
as reflected by his Duro opinion and his Lara concurrence about Congress 
subjecting to tribal jurisdiction non-tribal members who have not consented to 
such jurisdiction should not be forgotten. In Duro,84 after holding that Indian tribes 
had no criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, Justice Kennedy concluded 
by stating “The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain 
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal 
members.”85 Justice Kennedy picked up on his “consent of the governed” theory in 
his Lara concurrence,86 where he stated 
 
The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent 
of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that the 
Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the 
citizen the protection of two governments, the Nation and the State… 
Here, contrary to this design, the National Government seeks to subject a 
citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct 
occurring wholly within the territorial borders of the Nation and one of 
the States. This is unprecedented. There is a historical exception for 
Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe 
consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.87 
 
It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy was attempting to make a constitutional 
argument. Perhaps it can best be described as a quasi-constitutional one. The noted 
                                                                                                                                          
Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for 
a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 553 (2009)(In favor).  
82 For an analysis of the arguments involved see Comment, Will Trachman, Tribal 
Criminal Jurisdiction after U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro 
Fix, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 849 (2005). 
83 See for instance Morris v. Tanner, 288 F.Supp.2d 1133, 143 ((2003)(finding no due 
process violation because accused could invoke violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act 
which made provisions similar to the Bill of Rights applicable to the tribal court), and 
Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924. 935 (9th Cir. 2005)(Finding  no violation of Due 
Process because of the applicability of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the fact that under 
Navajo Nation law, the right to appointed counsel was provided to anyone under the 
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.)    
84 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
85 Id., at 693.  
86 541 U.S. 193, 211-214 (Justice Kennedy concurring) (2004).  
87 Id., at 212.  
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scholar Philip Frickey once described Kennedy’s argument in Lara as mystical, 
stating “Justice Kennedy’s opinion is mystical, in two senses of the word. His 
argument from deep constitutional structure and ongoing consent of the governed 
is not only obscure, but also seems to depend upon a direct communication with a 
sacred constitutional omnipresence to which at least some of the rest of us are not 
privy.”88 Whatever one might think of the argument, one thing is clear, Kennedy in 
his Lara opinion was attempting to provide strong legal policy arguments for not 
extending tribal jurisdiction over non-consenting individuals who are not tribal 
members.  
  
3.  The Court’s Major Concerns with Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Non-members 
 
In spite of the Court claiming to decide the existence of tribal civil jurisdiction 
on whether such jurisdiction is “necessary” to tribal self-government or whether 
there are consensual relations of the qualifying kind, some of the Justices who 
routinely ruled against tribal jurisdiction have at times highlighted what was really 
troubling them with tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members. Professor Fletcher 
has already summarized what non-tribal institutions, such as the Supreme Court, 
see as the main objections to tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members.89 Although 
I endorse his analysis, here are some additional comments summarizing my views 
about these objections.  The following six objections to tribal court jurisdiction are 
subjectively listed below in order of importance. 
First is the fact that the United States Constitution does not apply to Indian 
tribes. Early on, the Court ruled in Talton v. Mayes that unlike the federal and state 
governments, tribal governments were not bound by the Constitution.90 As stated 
by the Court,  
the existence of the right in congress to regulate the manner in which the local 
powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not render such local 
powers federal powers arising from and created by the constitution of the 
United States. It follows that, as the powers of local self-government enjoyed 
by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated 
upon by the fifth amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object 
to control the powers conferred by the constitution on the national 
government.91 
Justice Kennedy was the most concerned among the Justices with that fact. His 
decision in Duro v. Reina,92 denying Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians is normatively based on the fact that as citizens of the United 
                                                      
88 See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Policy, 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 467 (2005). 
89 See Fletcher, Unifying Theory, supra note10, at pp. 822-828.  
90 163 U.S. 376 (1896). This is not to say that tribal courts do not believe in 
fundamental fairness and due process. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and 
Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. Colo. 59 (2013). 
91 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).   
92 495 U.S. 676, 696-694 (1990).  
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States, non-member Indians have not consented to be governed by tribal entities 
outside the structure of the Constitution.93 Justice Kennedy restated these concerns 
in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lara, when he stated “Lara, after all, 
is a citizen of the United States. To hold that Congress can subject him, within our 
borders, to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a serious 
step.”94  
This argument, however, cannot be overstated. As explained below, the 1968 
Indian Civil Rights Act made almost all the provisions of the United States Bill of 
Rights applicable to tribal governments and their courts.95 In addition, not being 
bound by the United States Constitution is what make tribal courts unique. As 
explained below,96 some believe that making the Constitution applicable to tribal 
courts would completely assimilate them into the United States constitutional 
system and would amount to a “Devils Bargain.”97  
Second is the lack of independence in some tribal judiciaries. In other words, 
some tribes do not have the same principle of separation of power that we have. 
Therefore, some tribal judges do not have lifetime tenure and can be fired by the 
tribes’ Executive or Legislative branches. Justice Kennedy once stated that tribal 
courts were often “subordinated to the political branches of the tribal 
governments.”98 In a later case, Justice Souter agreed with this assessment.99  
While this is true of some tribal governments, it seems that the great majority of 
tribal courts have in fact a significant amount of independence from the other 
branches of the tribal government.100  Besides, not all judges are as independent as 
federal judges. State judges, for instance, may be independent from the state 
executive and legislative branches, but they are not immune from political 
pressures as many of them are elected and some can even accept campaign 
contributions.101    
Third is the fact that there is no mechanism for federal or state court to review 
tribal decisions even if the grounds for the tribal court’s decision are based on 
federal or state law. As stated by Justice Souter, this would result in “a risk of 
                                                      
93 See discussion supra at notes……. 
94 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004)(Kennedy concurring).  
95 See discussion infra at notes…… 
96  Se discussion infra at notes……  
97  Id., at notes……  
98 495 U.S. 676, at 693.  
99 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385.  
100 See Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the Independence of Native American Tribal 
Courts, 36  Hum. Rts. 16 (Winter 2009), Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts 
Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 7, 15. (1996).    
101 For a discussion on how problematic such contributions can be, see Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct 2252 (2009). For an overview of issues relating to Judicial 
bias, see Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 NYU J. Leg. & Pub. Pol. 631 (2015), Comment, 
Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The need for Reform, 38 Pe. L. Rev. 1109 
(2011).   
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substantial disuniformity in the interpretation of state and federal law.”102  While 
this observation is correct,103 the proposal I am putting forth in this article will go a 
substantial way in alleviating this concern.104   
Fourth is the so-called Democratic Deficit: The fact that non-members cannot 
participate in the political life of the tribes in that they cannot vote in tribal 
elections.105 For instance, Justice Kennedy in Duro v. Reina stated that the Court 
should “hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another 
group of citizens, non-member Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not 
include them.”106 Related to this concern is the accusation that tribal bodies that do 
not include non-members would be biased against such political outsiders.107 
Professor Fletcher called this objection “racial exceptionalism.”108 However, as he 
noted, citizens of one state are routinely subjected to the  jurisdiction of courts 
located in other states.109 In addition, foreigners can also be sued in the domestic 
courts of the United States.  It also has to be noted that in earlier decisions, the 
Court did not agree with these concerns.  For instance in Iowa Mutual v.. Laplante, 
the Court stated:  
 
Petitioner also contends that the policies underlying the grant of diversity 
jurisdiction—protection against local bias and incompetence—justify the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. We have rejected similar attacks 
on tribal court jurisdiction in the past… Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act 
provides non-Indians with various protections against unfair treatment in the 
tribal courts.110  
 
Fifth, many non-tribal judges see tribal law as foreign and different than regular 
American law. They claim that tribal law is frequently unwritten, and based on 
                                                      
102 Id., at 385.  
103  Although the Court in National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 
(1985), allowed non-members to challenge tribal court jurisdiction in Federal courts, in a 
subsequent case, Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), it took the position that once 
a federal court determined that the tribal court did have jurisdiction “proper deference to 
the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by [the non-member] and 
resolved in tribal court.” Id., at p. 19.   
104 Se discussion infra at notes… 
105 That expression as applied to Indian tribes was first coined and noted by Professor 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff in his book, Semblance of Sovereignty: The Constitution, The 
States, and American Citizenship 115 (2012).  
106 495 U.S. 676, at 693. 
107 Many of these accusations and concerns were rebutted by Professor Bethany 
Berger in Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 
37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1047 (2005). 
108 Fletcher, A Unifying Theory, at 826-827.  
109 Id., at 824. 
110 480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987).   
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orally transmitted customs and traditions.111 For instance, Justice Kennedy once 
expressed the view that tribal courts were “influenced by unique customs… 
unspoken practices, and norms.”112 Justice Souter described Tribal law as the 
results of a “complex mix… which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to 
sort out.”113 At least one scholar has noted, however, that most cases involving 
non-members would be based on western European legal concepts and would not 
involve traditional tribal law.114  
Sixth is not an objection as much as a pragmatic consideration based on 
political expediency. It is the fact that the Court is under the impression that in 
most of the cases where tribal jurisdiction has been denied, the tribal plaintiff could 
sue in state or federal court. For instance, in Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Scalia 
observed that the Tribe or its members could always “invoke the authority of the 
Federal Government and federal courts (or the state government and state courts) 
to vindicate constitutional or other federal and state- law rights.”115 Similarly in 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Justice Ginsburg concluded her opinion denying tribal 
court jurisdiction by stating “Gisela Fredericks may pursue her case against A-1 
Contractors and Stockert in the state forum open to all who sustain injuries on 
North Dakota’s Highway. Opening the Tribal Court for her optional use is not 
necessary to tribal self-government.”116 
Although this perception has, legally speaking, some validity,117 it is 
problematic for many reservation Indians. While I do not doubt that tribal 
governments and Indian owned businesses would have no problem filing lawsuits 
in federal or state courts, the same cannot be said of the many reservation Indians 
who live below the poverty level.118 For such individuals, the same criticisms that 
is levelled when courts authorize non-Indians to be sued in culturally unfamiliar 
and different tribal courts can be applied to forcing poverty stricken reservation 
Indians to file lawsuits in federal or state courts.  
 
                                                      
111 Professor Fletcher has referred to this objection as “cultural Exceptionalism.” See 
A Unifying Theory, at 826. 
112 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, at 693 (1990).  
113 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, at 384-385 (2001)(Justice Souter, concurring).  
114 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Towards a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common 
Law, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 701 (2006). 
115 533 U.S. 353 at 373 (2001).  
116 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).  
117  For instance, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984), the Court stated “As a general matter, tribal self-government 
is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other 
persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian Country.” 
Id., at 148-49.  
118 For a summary of current economic conditions on Indian reservations, see Robert 
J. Miller, Sovereign Resilience: Reviving Private-Sector Economic Institutions in Indian 
Country, 2018 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1332, at 1335-1339 (2018). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458087 
16 INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION  
PART II:  POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TENDING TO ALLEVIATE THE 
COURT’S CONCERNS 
 
Although there were previous legislative proposals introduced in Congress, 
for one reason or another, such proposals never made it into law.119 In all the 
solutions described below, the proposed statutes would first confirm or reaffirm 
the jurisdiction of tribal courts over many if not all lawsuits arising in Indian 
Country.120 However, because the principal concern of the Court seems to be the 
lack of constitutional protections afforded litigants in tribal courts, the following 
three proposals would afford non-member litigants either all or many of the 
protections guaranteed under the United States Constitution Bill of Rights. All 
three proposals would also provide some sort of federal court review of alleged 
violations of rights guaranteed by the legislation.  
 
1.  The VAWA 2013 Model: Guaranteeing Non-members Many If Not All 
Constitutional Protections in Tribal Courts 
 
After some 35 years, tribal advocates finally succeeded in enacting legislation 
partially overturning the 1978 Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe that had divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.121 Thus, 
what is now known as VAWA 2013 reaffirmed tribal jurisdiction over all people, 
Indians and non-Indians, accused of certain crimes of domestic violence provided 
certain conditions were met and some constitutional rights guaranteed to these 
defendants.122  
Although previous legislation, known as the Duro Fix,123 overturning a 
Supreme Court decision denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member 
Indians had simply reaffirmed the existence of such inherent tribal jurisdiction 
over such crimes,124 this partial Oliphant Fix ended up being more complicated.125 
In order to get Congress’s agreement to the legislation, tribal interests had to agree 
to the following:  
 
                                                      
119 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law, supra note 17, at 
318-320 (describing past legislative proposals.)  
120 Indian Country is a term of art derived from 18 USC 1151 according to which the 
following are treated as Indian lands for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis: 1. All lands 
within Indian reservations, 2. All trust lands held by the U.S. for the benefit of Indians or 
tribes, 3. Lands set aside by the federal government for Dependent Indian Communities..  
121 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
122 25 U.S.C. 1304 et. Seq. The Tribal provisions were part of the Violence Against 
Woman Act Re-authorization of 2013.  
123 Codified at 25 U.S. C. 1301(2). 
124 See discussion supra at notes… 
125 For an insightful and comprehensive examination of VAWA 2013, see Angela R. 
Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1565 (2016). 
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a. The pool of jurors in such criminal trials has to come from a cross section of the 
local population with no group, such as non-tribal members, automatically 
excluded.126  
b. Tribal governments have to provide an indigent defendant a defense attorney.127  
c. Defendants have to be given any other rights necessary for the Bill to be 
constitutional.128 
d. Defendants have to be provided all other rights available under the Indian Civil 
Right Act of 1968 as amended,129 which include among others the right to 
effective assistance of counsel if sentences can exceed one year in jail  
e. Defendants have the right to appeal their convictions to federal courts pursuant 
to the writ of Habeas Corpus.130  
 
A Bill extending constitutional provisions to non-member civil litigants in 
tribal courts would be much less burdensome on tribal governments in that 
constitutional requirements governing civil litigation are less extensive than those 
applicable to criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, although advocated by some 
scholars,131 making the Constitution applicable to Indian tribes is politically 
sensitive and problematic.132 The next model would not make constitutional rights 
per se applicable to Indian tribes. 
 
2.  The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) Model: Providing Non-members Federal 
Court Review of Alleged ICRA Violations in Civil Cases. 
 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act affording the statutory 
equivalent of almost all the protections of the Bill of Rights to people subjected to 
tribal governmental power.133  However, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,134 the 
Supreme Court held that people complaining of civil rights violation could not 
appeal to federal courts unless they were petitioning the court for habeas corpus. In 
other words, federal courts did not have jurisdiction over any cases alleging ICRA 
violations unless the plaintiffs were also incarcerated or their liberty was at least 
meaningfully restricted.  
                                                      
126 25 U.S.C. 1304(d)(3). 
127 25 U.S.C. (f)(2). Federal grants covering such costs were made available to tribes 
in the legislation.  
128 1304(d)(4). Whether any more or all constitutional rights will have to be given has 
not been answered by the courts yet. See Comment, Special Domestic Violence Criminal 
Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes: Inherent Sovereignty v. Defendant’s Complete 
Constitutional Rights, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243 (2015).  
129 1304 (d)(2) (Making applicable all rights of defendants under 25 U.S.C. 1302 (c)) 
130 25 U.S.C. 1304 (e)(1).  
131 See for instance, L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty 
after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669 (2003).  
132 See discussion at PART III (2).  
133 Pub. Law 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq. 
134 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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One solution, previously recommended by some,135 and perhaps less drastic 
than the previous one, would allow non-members alleging violation of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act the right to appeal tribal court judgments to federal courts. This 
proposal is less drastic than the previous one because the ICRA guarantees certain 
statutory rights that, although similar to some constitutional rights, have not been 
interpreted as equivalent to constitutional rights.136  
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court first held that the Pueblo could not be sued 
in federal court because the ICRA lacked clear and unequivocal congressional 
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.137 Secondly, the Court held that while 
the official immunity of the tribal officials could implicitly be abrogated, ICRA did 
not contain such an implied cause of action to that effect. The proposed legislation 
being discussed here would just create such a cause of action against tribal judges 
or other tribal officials as long as the non-member complainant alleged that the 
tribal court proceedings or its implementation resulted or would result in violations 
of the Indian Civil Rights Act. While this would amount to a modification of Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, it would not totally overrule the case. The proposal 
would not allow individuals to sue tribes in federal courts for any claimed violation 
of ICRA. The proposal would only allow non-member defendants to appeal tribal 
court judgments to federal courts if they are alleging violation of the Indian civil 
rights Act emanating from tribal court proceedings or orders.  
 
3.  Creating a Presumption of Tribal Jurisdiction Rebuttable When Tribal Courts 
Have Not Applied Fundamental Notions of Fairness or Due Process 
 
In an insightful article, Professor Matthew Fletcher argued that the Court 
should adopt a presumption of tribal jurisdiction over Indian owned lands within 
Indian reservations.138  However, non-members litigants would be able to file 
lawsuits in federal or state courts in order to rebut the presumption of tribal 
jurisdiction. The presumption would be rebutted if the non-members were denied a 
fundamentally fair decision-making process.139 His proposal only applies over 
conduct of non-members on Indian owned land.  As to conduct within Indian 
                                                      
135 See for instance, Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, at 
113-119 (1986). See also Amy Conners, The Scalpel and the Ax: Federal Review of Tribal 
Decisions in the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44 Colum Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 199, 246-52 
(2012).  
136 See Developments in the Law: ICRA Reconsidered: New Interpretation of 
Familiar Rights, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (2016), Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative 
Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479 (2000).  
137 436 U.S. 49, at 58-59.  
138 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 Ariz. St. L. J. 
779 (2014). 
139 Id., at 786.  
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reservations occurring on land owned in fee by non-members, the Montana 
analysis would still be applicable.140  
At first, it seemed that Professor Fletcher’s proposal was limited to federal 
court review for lack of adequate tribal “process” which I understood to mean 
procedural due process.141 However, later parts of his article seem to also advocate 
for more general federal court review of whether tribal litigants were given enough 
“American constitutional rights.”142  On the other hand, Professor Fletcher 
indicated that whether a tribe had provided enough constitutional rights was a 
determination that could be made along the same lines as what courts do when 
“deciding whether to grant comity to foreign judgments.”143  
Professor Fletcher made his proposal while arguing for a shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. His argument was not made in connection with proposing 
legislation. However, when it comes to legislation, a problem with Fletcher’s 
“fundamental fairness” standard is that it would be very complicated to codify. 
Thus, the statute would have to specify exactly what constituted a denial of 
“fundamental fairness.” Although Professor Fletcher makes a worthy effort to 
specify what he is envisioning when it comes to fundamental fairness,144 the task 
of actually codifying such concept in legislation could end up being much more 
complicated and politically difficult than envisioned. Yet without such 
specifications, the courts would be left to themselves to define such concept and 
we may end up with just about most of the Bill of Rights applicable to tribal 
courts. This would make the Fletcher proposal not much different than the two 
previous ones.  
I think one possible reason Fletcher did not confine himself to procedural due 
process is that his proposal reaches both tribal adjudicative and regulatory 
jurisdiction and procedural due process rights either do not apply or apply only 
minimally in the enactment of legislation or regulations.145 Because this Essay is 
only concerned with the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts, Fletcher’s proposal 
should be construed to allow federal court review to rebut the presumption of tribal 
court civil jurisdiction only in cases where tribal courts have not given non-
members all the rights required under general notions of procedural due process.146 
                                                      
140 Id., at 830. 
141 See Fletcher, A Unified Theory, discussion at pp. 831-838, mentioning the need for 
fair, unbiased, and competent tribal judges as well as an independent tribal judiciary.  
142 Id., discussion at pp. 835-838.  
143 Id., at 838.  
144 46 Ariz. L. J. at 830-840. 
145 This is the classic dichotomy between Londoner v. Denver(adjudication), 210 U.S. 
373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic v. Colorado (Rulemaking), 239 U.S. 441 (1915), familiar to all 
students of Administrative law holding that procedural due process applies to adjudicative 
proceedings but not to rulemaking.  
146 For another proposal advocating expanded federal court review see Miller, The 
Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 
114 Colum. L. Rev. 1825 (2014). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458087 
20 INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION  
In other words, the proposal should not cover all potential denial of constitutional 
rights to non-members.  
 Even then, the legislation could be hard to draft with specificity as the 
panoply of procedural rights is quite large.147 Federal courts, however, have 
developed a comprehensive jurisprudence to determine when and how much 
process should be given in any given case.148 The legislation should therefore give 
federal courts deference in reviewing tribal proceedings to decide if they have 
conformed with the requirements of procedural due process. The next section of 
this Essay addresses a different issue with the three proposals analyzed above: The 
problem with “constitutionally” incorporating Indian tribes into the federalist 
system.  
 
4.  A Critique of These Three Proposals: Indian Tribes Should not be Incorporated 
Within Our Constitutional Federalism. 
 
In an upcoming article, Professor Michael Doran argued that the Court’s 
implicit divestiture doctrine was a solution the Court devised to protect the 
constitutional or fundamental rights of non-tribal members without completely 
destroying tribal sovereignty.149 To counter the negative impacts of the implicit 
divestiture doctrine on tribal sovereignty, Professor Doran summarized various 
possibilities that would restore tribal jurisdiction but would also protect 
fundamental rights. However, he ended up finding such proposals either politically 
unacceptable or otherwise detrimental to Indian tribes.150 One of the possible 
solution he mentioned was allowing Indian tribes to assume full civil jurisdiction 
over their territories but “forcing tribal governments into the federalist 
structure.”151 This would “require tribal governments to respect fundamental rights 
of non-tribal members as those rights have been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court.”152 Describing such solution as a “Devil’s Bargain,”153 Professor Doran 
noted that this remedy may be more harmful to tribes than the implicit divestiture 
doctrine itself. Underscoring this finding is that Indian tribes are better off 
remaining “outside” the U.S. constitutional system. In other words, incorporating 
the tribes within our constitutional system would destroy them as distinct 
sovereigns and would end up being worse for the tribes even if this meant that 
under the continued use of the Implicit Divestiture doctrine, tribes would 
eventually end up losing all civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members.  
                                                      
147 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)(listing a number of available 
procedural rights.) 
148 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
149 Michael Doran, Redefining Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental Rights 
(forthcoming, Indiana Law Review), Electronic Copy available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398215.  
150 Id., at 71-77 
151 Id., at p. 74. 
152 Id.  
153 Id., at 77  
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I have in the past warned against such assimilative influences.154 More 
recently, however, although conceding that making some aspects of due process 
applicable to Indian tribes would be problematic,155 I argued that it may be worth 
it, especially if that choice was at tribal option.156 In her analysis about the 
implementation of VAWA 2013, Professor Angela Riley also acknowledged the 
problems with making constitutional provisions applicable to Indian tribes.157 
However, she concluded that some constitutional provisions could be applied to 
Indian tribes without jeopardizing their cultural and political distinctiveness. First, 
she noted that a lot of existing tribal court procedures are already similar if not 
identical to the ones applied in federal and state courts.158 Secondly, she argued 
that tribes could emphasize their distinctiveness by moving away from the carceral 
state approach prevalent in federal and state sentencing systems and adopt 
sentencing provisions more closely affiliated with tribal traditions and culture.159 
In debating whether tribes already have or should be “incorporated” into the 
United States, one should keep in mind that there is a difference between 
“political” incorporation and “constitutional” incorporation, especially if that term 
is understood to mean that all constitutional provisions would be applicable to 
tribal governments. I have elsewhere argued that Tribes could be “incorporated” 
into the United States federalist system without being totally assimilated into the 
federal structure.160 In other words, tribes could be incorporated into the federal 
system under a third sphere of sovereignty that would allow them to keep their 
distinctiveness.161 Indian tribes have already been, at least partially, politically 
incorporated into the United States. True enough, there is not one defining 
congressional Act incorporating tribes into the United States.162 However, tribes 
were geographically incorporated within the territory of the United States under 
the doctrine of Discovery as interpreted in Johnson v. M’Intosh.163 Furthermore, 
they were politically incorporated incrementally within the United States system as 
                                                      
154 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Troublesome Aspects of Western Influence on Tribal 
Justice System and Laws, 1 Tribal Law Journal 2007 
155 See Skibine, Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 12, at 132-133, citing 
Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 Kans. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 17 (1997). 
156 Id., at 134.  
157 Angela Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 U.C.L.A. L. Rev 
1565, 1595-1603 (2016).  
158 Id., at 1614. See also Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused 
of Crimes: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 317, 320-321 
(2013).  
159 Id., at 1622-1630.  
160 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the 
Inherent Powers of Indian tribes, 39 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 77 (2014-15). 
161 Id., at 689-693 (arguing for a self-determination Paradigm of incorporation.)  
162 See Milner S. Ball, Constitution., Court, and Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. B. Found. 
Res. J. 1, 37 (1987).  
163 21 U.S. 543 (1923).  
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a result of cumulative legislation enacted by Congress throughout history:164 
Legislation such as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,165 the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934,166 the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,167 and the 
Indian Self Determination Act of 1975.168  
It is true, however, that the tribes have never been constitutionally 
incorporated into the United States. 169 As Professor Frank Pommersheim has 
urged, the confusion surrounding the constitutional status and incorporation of 
Indian tribes within our federalist system should be resolved through a 
constitutional amendment.170 In the last Part of this Article, I attempt to counter the 
effect of the implicit divestiture doctrine without assimilating the tribes 
constitutionally into the federal structure.  
 
PART III:  INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION: MINIMIZING FEDERAL 
COURTS INTERFERENCE WITH TRIBAL LEGAL NORMS 
 
1.  Making Personal Jurisdiction Doctrines Applicable to Tribal Courts 
 
In this part, following on an idea expressed by Professor Katherine Florey, I 
propose to legislatively reconfirm tribal court jurisdiction over all causes of actions 
arising in Indian Country as long as the tribal court can establish personal 
jurisdiction over the parties.171  
In her Article, Professor Florey convincingly demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court’s statement first enunciated in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,172 that “A tribe 
adjudicative Jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction,”173 has no 
theoretical validity.174 Other commentators have also noted that the Court never 
                                                      
164 See generally, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes 
within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667, at 
669-677 (2006).  
165 8 U.S.C. 1401(b). 
166 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq. 
167 25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.  
168 25 U.S.C. 450a-450n.. 
169 See David E. Wilkins, A Constitutional Confession: The Permanent Malleable 
Status of Indigenous Nations, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 473 (2003). 
170 Frank Pommersheim, Is there a (Little or not so Little) Constitutional Crisis 
Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 271, 285 (2003).  
171 See Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’ 
jurisdiction, 101 Cal L. Rev. 1499 (2013). Other scholars have expressed similar views. 
See for instance Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty: The Negative 
Doctrinal Feedback Loop and the Rise of the New Exceptionalism, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 
47, 52-53 (2005) 
172 520 U.S. 438 (1997) 
173 Id., at 453. See also Nevada v. Hicks. 533 U.S. 353, at 367 (2001)(endorsing the 
statement). 
174 Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, at 1532-1536.  
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gave any reasons whatsoever for this statement.175 Florey’s argument is that tribal 
courts should be considered courts of general jurisdiction and be treated like state 
courts when it comes to determining the extent of their jurisdiction.  
Professor Florey further explained that the Court’s concerns with lack of due 
process in tribal court proceedings would be taken care of by having the doctrines 
of personal jurisdiction applicable to tribal courts in the same fashion as they are 
applied in state and federal courts.176 According to Florey, the Court in 
International Shoe v. Washington,177 devised a test allowing a court’s jurisdiction 
as long as the defendant maintained minimum contacts with the jurisdictional 
forum and such judicial jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial Justice.178 Furthermore, Professor Florey noted that in Asahi Metal 
Industry v. Superior Court,179 the Court took the position that “even if minimum 
contacts were present, a lack of reasonableness could defeat personal 
jurisdiction.”180 As Florey explained, “reasonable concerns about fairness, bias and 
unfair surprise exist when non-members … are haled into tribal courts as 
defendants,” however, these “are the traditional concerns of personal 
jurisdiction.”181 
Tribal courts have in the past already used principles of personal jurisdiction 
derived from U.S. Supreme Court precedents to determine their own 
jurisdiction.182  It is important to note, however, that principles of constitutional 
due process applied to delineate the extent of personal jurisdiction by the United 
States Supreme Court are currently not applicable to tribes as such since tribes, 
unlike the states and the federal government, are not bound by the United States 
Constitution.183 As one commentator has argued, however, due process 
requirements are already applicable to tribes through the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA).184 That same commentator also argued, however, that federal courts have 
                                                      
175 See for instance M. Gatsby Miller, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1825, 1837 (2014) 
(noting the lack of justifications and attempting to provide some.  
176 Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, at 1506-07.  
177 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added).  
178 Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, at 1510. 
179 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
180 Florey, at 1556.  
181 Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, at 1557. 
182 See Grant Christensen, Personal Jurisdiction and Tribal Courts After Walden and 
Bauman: The inadvertent impact of Supreme Court Jurisdictional Decisions on Indian 
Country, 68 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1367, 1378 (2016)(stating that although tribal courts do not 
have to abide by the same constitutional standards as state and federal courts, “In practice, 
however, tribal courts consult Supreme Court precedent such that the meaning of due 
process found in the Indian Civil Rights Act is given a virtually identical meaning to the 
clause in its Fourteenth Amendment sister.” Id.  
183 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
184 See David A. Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. Or. L. 
Rev. 1253 (2006). 
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not and should not find an implied cause of action in the ICRA for challenging 
tribal courts determinations of personal jurisdiction to federal courts.185  
Under my proposal, which would impose constitutionally based requirements 
of personal jurisdiction on tribal courts, findings of personal jurisdiction by tribal 
courts would be appealable to federal courts after exhaustion of tribal court 
remedies. Such exhaustion requirements are currently mandated under National 
Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe.186 Although the general rule mandating exhaustion 
of tribal court remedies was imposed before plaintiffs could challenge the subject 
matter jurisdiction of tribal courts, they should remain applicable to a challenge of 
personal jurisdiction determinations made by tribal courts as the normative reasons 
for the general rule would still be applicable.187 Initially, the Court did note three 
exceptions to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.188 These three exceptions would  
continue to be applicable to cases challenging the personal jurisdiction 
determinations made by tribal courts under my proposal.  In Strate v. A-1- 
Contractors, however, the Court added a fourth exception, stating “When, as in 
this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of 
nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana 's main rule, it will be equally 
evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from 
such conduct.”189 That exception would no longer be applicable under my 
proposed legislation since the legislation would reaffirm the subject matter 
jurisdiction of tribal courts as long as the constitutional due process requirements 
for personal jurisdiction were met. 
                                                      
185 Id., at 1277-1281. The commentator noted under current Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, it is even harder to find a implied statutory cause of action than it was in 
1978 when the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, refused to find an 
implied cause of action against tribal officials for alleged violations of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act. Id., at 60-66. 
186 471 U.S. 845 (1985).  
187 As the National Farmers Court stated: “We believe that examination should be 
conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized 
that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-
determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is 
being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the 
challenge.  Moreover, the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be 
served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits 
or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed...  Exhaustion of tribal court 
remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis 
for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their 
expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review,  471 U.S. 845, 856–57 
(1985). 
188 The National Farmers Court stated “We do not suggest that exhaustion would be 
required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is 
conducted in bad faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional 
prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate 
opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction.” Id., at 857.   
189 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
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At this point, some may argue that there is not that much difference between 
my proposal and Professor Fletcher’s. Set forth below is an enumeration of the 
differences:  
First, probably to make his proposal more palatable to anti-tribal interests, 
Professor Fletcher restricted his proposal to Indian owned fee land within the 
reservation and stated that tribal jurisdiction over non-member owned land should 
continue to be determined under the Montana doctrine. Under my proposal, the 
legislative restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-members would include all 
lands within tribal territories. Secondly, I am confining my legislative restoration 
to the adjudicative jurisdiction of tribal courts. Unlike Fletcher, I do not address 
the legislative/regulatory jurisdiction of tribal governments. Under my proposal, 
tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-members would continue to be determined 
under Federal common law. Third, federal court review of tribal court jurisdiction 
under my understanding of Professor’s Fletcher proposal is confined to looking for 
lack of procedural due process. Under my proposal, federal courts would just 
review whether tribal courts correctly determined that they had personal 
jurisdiction over the parties.  
I understand that, politically speaking, transposing the Florey personal 
jurisdiction approach to a legislative proposal may be seen as too pro tribal for 
those in Congress who are objecting to tribal jurisdiction. The rest of this Essay 
will explore this issue.  
 
2.  General Difficulties with Enacting Pro-tribal Legislation  
 
Past legislative settlements in the field of Federal Indian Law have required 
many compromises with non-tribal interests. So far, the pro tribal interests 
managed only a partial overturning of Oliphant 35 years after the Court issued that 
decision.190 On top of that, the tribes still had to guarantee the required 
constitutional protections before being allowed to reacquire such jurisdiction.191 In 
other areas of federal Indian law, while Congress was able to initially enact a 
relatively balanced compromise on Indian gaming with the passage of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988,192 tribal interests have not yet been 
successful in overcoming the negative impacts of the Court’s decision in Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida,193 where the Court held that Congress could not use its Indian 
Commerce power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
                                                      
190 See discussion supra at notes… 
191 See discussion at notes… 
192 Pub. L. 199-497, 102 State 2467 (1988)(codified at 25 U.S.C. 2701 et.seq.). For a 
comprehensive description of the negotiations that led to IGRA by one of the key players 
in such negotiations, see Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: 
background and legislative History, 42 Ariz. St. L. J. 99 (2010).  
193 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
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Immunity so as to allow tribes to sue states that failed to negotiate in good faith the 
required tribal state gaming compacts.194  
Similarly, the tribes have yet to successfully push a legislative fix to the 
controversial Carcieri decision,195 which held that only tribes under federal 
jurisdiction as of 1934 could benefit from a section in the law allowing the 
Secretary of the Interior to transfer land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.196 
The same goes for Alaska v. Village of Venetie,197 another questionable opinion 
where the Court declared that the 40 million acres set aside for Alaskan Indians in 
the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) were not Indian Country.198 
This meant that federally recognized Indian tribes in Alaska could no longer 
exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the lands they owned in fee pursuant to 
ANCSA.  
The lack of success in the areas just mentioned does not mean that Indian 
tribes are never successful.199 There has been dozens of tribal land settlement Acts 
enacted into law,200 and an even larger amount of Indian Water Rights 
Settlements.201 In addition, there are dozens of tribal specific bills enacted in every 
Congress, one of them even overturned an anti-tribal Supreme Court decision.202 
However, the tribes will need to put forward some compelling reasons as to why 
legislation restoring tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction over non-members is important 
and necessary. Professors Fletcher and Tweedy have each enumerated some valid 
reasons supporting at least some restoration of tribal civil jurisdiction.203 Thus, 
Fletcher cited 1. Congressional and Executive public policy, 2. Protecting the 
dignity of tribes as sovereigns, 3. Improving tribal governance capacity, 4. 
Evolving tribal economic and political circumstances, and 5. Lack of federal and 
state court jurisdiction over tribal lands.204 Tweedy added 1. Erosion of tribal 
                                                      
194 Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988), codified at 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq. On this 
topic, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 Harv. J. on Leg. 
39 (2007). 
195 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) 
196 For a comprehensive analysis of the decision and this area of the law, see William 
Wood, Indian Tribes, and (federal) Jurisdiction 65 U. Kansas L. Rev. 415 (2016).  
197 522 U.S. 520 (1998) 
19843 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. See generally, Gregory D. Strommer and Stephen D. 
Osborne, Indian Country and the Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 Alaska L. 
Rev. 1 (2005). 
199 See Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra at note 16. 
200 Id. 
201 At last count, there were some 32 Indian water rights settlements that had been 
enacted into law since 1978. For a summary and analysis of some of these water rights 
settlement, see Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning, and 
Negotiated Settlements, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (2010).  
202 See Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (overturning Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish 
Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012).  
203 See Fletcher, A Unifying Theory, supra at note…, Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, 
supra at note…...  
204 Fletcher Id. At 804-821.  
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culture and institutions, 2. Disempowerment of tribal courts, 3. Lack of respect for 
tribes, 4. Lack of funding for tribal justice systems, 5. Waste of resources, 6. 
Inability to protect tribal interests, and 7. Lawlessness.205  
Yet, I understand that allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-members as long 
as personal jurisdiction can be established could face an uphill battle even if tribal 
courts’ findings of personal jurisdiction can be appealed to federal courts. For one 
thing, it will be increasingly hard for tribes to push legislation restoring some kind 
of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members if lobbying groups opposed to tribal 
jurisdiction start believing that the Court will eventually prohibit all tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members. To counter this problem, in the next section, I 
propose a political compromise that some tribes may wish to consider in order to 
convince groups generally opposed to tribal jurisdiction not to lobby against the 
proposal.  
 
3.  Facilitating Passage of the Legislation by Allowing for Removal of Tribal 
Court Cases to Federal Courts 
 
One possible idea to improve the chances of passing the proposed legislative 
solution would be to allow non-member defendants being sued in tribal courts to 
remove their cases to federal courts under certain circumstances. This proposal 
would follow the model set forth in 28 U.S.C.1441 for removal of civil actions 
from state to federal courts.206 In other words, removal could be granted only in 
cases the federal court would otherwise have jurisdiction.  In other words, in cases 
involving  federal questions or meeting the diversity requirements.  
I am aware that this removal option may not be popular with some tribal 
advocates. Yet, I believe this proposal may be less drastic or detrimental to tribal 
sovereign interests than anticipated: First, the burden to persuade federal courts to 
accept removal would be on the non-tribal parties seeking removal. These removal 
requirements can be hard to navigate.207 Secondly, even if a case is removed, the 
law of the initial forum, tribal law, should still be applicable to the proceedings.208 
Finally, in order to limit federal interference with the distinct nature of tribal 
judiciaries,209 I would not grant an unlimited right to remove tribal cases to federal 
                                                      
205 Tweedy, id., at pp. 683-689.  
206 28 U.S.C 1441 (a) reads: Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of 
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where 
such action is pending.”  
207 Foe a concise summary see, Charles J. Hyland, Removal for Federal Court: The 
Practitioner’s Tightrope, 63-Nov J. Kan. B.A. 22 (1994). 
208 See Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law 
Principles Should Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 1627, 1651-
1655 (2006)(explaining modern choice of law theories.)  
209 For an argument supporting the benefits of having tribes remain as culturally and 
politically different from non-tribal governments see Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal 
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courts. Instead, federal courts should abstain from granting removal in cases where 
important tribal governmental interests are involved unless the federal court finds 
that the litigation below was 1. motivated by a desire to harass, or 2. conducted in 
bad faith, or 3. tribal jurisdiction was plainly lacking, or 4. the non-member 
defendant lacked a fair opportunity to present his case in that the tribal forum was 
biased or the non-member party was barred on procedural grounds from raising his 
claims.  
This modification/addition to the removal requirements contained 28 USC 
1441 somewhat tracks the exceptions to the exhaustion of tribal remedies 
doctrine,210 but recast them in a different context. It is also inspired by the Younger 
Doctrine,211 as well as the other federal abstention doctrines.212 The three 
requirements for Younger to apply are: 1. Parallel state proceedings, 2. Implication 
of important state interests, and 3. Lack of adequate forums for the party resisting 
abstention to raise her (federal) claims.213 On the other hand, the three exceptions 
to application of Younger abstention are: 1. Bad faith and harassment, or 2. A 
patently unconstitutional state statute, or 3. An inadequate state forum in that it is 
biased or the party is barred on procedural grounds from raising its federal 
claims.214  
An option worth considering from a tribal perspective would be to limit 
removal to federal question cases and not include diversity. Similarly, those 
opposed to tribal jurisdiction would probably push to go beyond diversity of state 
citizenship and allow all non-members to remove cases to federal courts. The 
normative argument against both these positions, one pro tribal the other one not, 
is that in order to be correctly integrated into the federal system, tribal courts 
should be treated, as much as possible, on par with state courts when it comes to 
their relations with the federal courts. Thus, for uniformity sake, the whole federal 
                                                                                                                                          
Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 225 (1994), Katherine Florey, 
Making it work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and the Future of Tribes as Regulatory 
Laboratories, 92 Washington L. Rev. 713 (2017).  
210 See discussion supra at note …  
211 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  
212 Generally speaking, the federal abstention doctrines are based on notions of 
federalism aimed at protecting the sovereign interests of the states of the Union. Therefore, 
these doctrines would not be applicable to shield Indian tribes from federal interference. 
For a short overview of the abstention doctrines, see Beth Shankle Anderson, “Our 
Federalism,” the Younger Abstention Doctrine, and its Companions, 81-Nov Fla. B. J. 9 
(2007).  
213 On the Younger Abstention doctrine and its intricacies in the context of removal 
see Plitt and Rogers, CHARTING A COURSE FOR FEDERAL REMOVAL THROUGH 
THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE: A TITANIC EXPERIENCE IN THE SARGASSO 
SEA OF JURISDICTIONAL MANIPULATION, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 107. See also, Daniel 
C. Norris, The Final Frontier of Younger Abstention: The Judiciary’s Abdication of the 
Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 103 (2003). 
214 See Drew Alan Hillier, Note, The Necessity of an Equity and Comity Analysis in 
Younger Abstention Doctrine, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1975 (2014) (explaining the Younger 
exceptions). 
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removal statute should, to the extent possible, treat tribal and state courts in the 




For about forty years now, the Supreme Court has been engaged in a 
measured attack on tribal sovereignty when it comes to tribal jurisdiction over non-
members. Although the Court has devised a test seeming to determine the amount 
of tribal jurisdiction on whether the exercise of that governmental power is 
“necessary” to tribal self-government, in reality, the Court wants to protect or 
shield non-members from tribunals that are not bound by the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights.215 Also of concern to the Court is the fact that tribal court orders in the area 
of civil jurisdiction are not appealable to federal courts except when one is 
challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribal court.216 To remedy this 
situation, this Essay has proposed a legislative solution which would reaffirm the 
civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over non-member defendants as long as personal 
jurisdiction over such parties could be established.  However, tribal court 
determinations of personal jurisdiction could be appealed to federal forums. 
Furthermore, in order to facilitate enactment of such legislation, this Essay has 
suggested that tribes should consider adding legislative language allowing non-
members being sued in tribal forums to remove their cases to federal courts if 
certain conditions are met.  
I believe this solution goes a long way in  incorporating or reconfirming 
Indian nations as the Third Sovereign within the United States’ legal system.217  At 
the same time, it achieves this goal without “assimilating” Indian Nations within 
our constitutional system in that it does not make the tribal courts subject to all 
constitutional restrictions except for the requirements of establishing personal 
jurisdiction.     
                                                      
215 See Doran, Redefining Tribal Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental Rights, 
supra at note… 
216 See discussion at note … 
217 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal 
Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1997).  
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